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HONEST ELEMENTARY DEGREES AND DEGREES OF RELATIVE
PROVABILITY WITHOUT THE CUPPING PROPERTY
PAUL SHAFER
Abstract. An element a of a lattice cups to an element b > a if there is a c < b such that a∪c = b.
An element of a lattice has the cupping property if it cups to every element above it. We prove
that there are non-zero honest elementary degrees that do not have the cupping property, which
answers a question of Kristiansen, Schlage-Puchta, and Weiermann [17]. In fact, we show that if b
is a sufficiently large honest elementary degree, then b has the anti-cupping property, which means
that there is an a with 0 <E a <E b that does not cup to b. For comparison, we also modify a
result of Cai [8] to show, in several versions of the degrees of relative provability that are closely
related to the honest elementary degrees, that in fact all non-zero degrees have the anti-cupping
property, not just sufficiently large degrees.
1. Introduction
An element a of a lattice cups to an element b > a if there is a c < b such that a ∪ c = b. An
element a of a lattice has the cupping property if it cups to every b > a. An element b of a lattice
with 0 has the anti-cupping property if there is an a with 0 < a < b that does not cup to b. So,
if a, b > 0 in a lattice with 0, a witnesses that b has the anti-cupping property if and only if b
witnesses that a does not have the cupping property. In this work, we study cupping in several
related lattices arising from elementary functions and total algorithms.
The first lattice we consider is the the lattice H of honest elementary degrees, which arose from
attempts to classify various sub-recursive classes of functions into hierarchies. In H, the objects
are (equivalence classes of) functions whose graphs are elementary relations, and these functions
are compared via the ‘elementary in’ relation. The basic theory of this structure was developed
by Meyer and Ritchie [21] and by Machtey [18–20]. In recent years, intense work mainly by
Kristiansen [11–17] has significantly advanced the theory. We refer the reader to [16] (and to the
related [17]) for a survey of the area. In [17], the authors ask if every non-zero a ∈ H has the
cupping property. We answer this question negatively by showing that if b ∈ H is sufficiently large
(in the sense of Definition 3.1), then b has the anti-cupping property (Corollary 3.4). Thus if b ∈ H
is sufficiently large, then every a ∈ H witnessing that b has the anti-cupping property is a non-zero
degree that does not have the cupping property.
Next we consider two related families of lattices: the degrees of provability relative to arithmetical
theories extending IΣ1 and the honest α-elementary degrees for ordinals α ≤ ǫ0 of the form ω
β .
Let T be a consistent first-order theory in the language of arithmetic. In PT , the degrees of
provability relative to T , the objects are (equivalence classes of) total algorithms (i.e., indices of
total Turing machines), and these algorithms are compared via the ‘provably total’ relation. That
is, degT (Φ) ≥T degT (Ψ) if T ⊢ tot(Φ) → tot(Ψ), where tot(Φ) is the sentence expressing the
totality of the Turing machine Φ. Cai [7] introduced the degrees of relative provability in order
to analyze the provability strengths of true Π2 sentences or, equivalently, sentences expressing the
totality of total algorithms. This line of research continues impressively in [2, 8, 9].
In Hα, the honest α-elementary degrees, the objects are again (equivalence classes of) functions
whose graphs are elementary, and these functions are compared via the ‘α-elementary in’ relation,
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which coarsens the ‘elementary in’ relation by allowing functions to be iterated β < α many times.
Kristiansen, Schlage-Puchta, and Weiermann [17] introduced the honest α-elementary degrees and
proved a correspondence between the ‘α-elementary in’ relation and the ‘provably total’ relation
relative to Peano arithmetic (PA). Such correspondences between sub-recursive hierarchies and
provably total functions can be useful for analyzing the logical strengths of formal systems. See,
for example, Beklemishev’s work in [3–6]
The degrees of relative provability and the honest α-elementary degrees are very closely related.
For a theory T , let T+ be the extension of T by all true Π1 sentences. Kristiansen [15] proves that
PPA+ and Hǫ0 are isomorphic, and analogous results should hold for various fragments of PA and
the appropriate ordinals.
Cai [8] proves that there are non-zero elements of PPA+ that do not have the cupping property.
It follows from Kristiansen’s isomorphism that there are also non-zero elements of Hǫ0 that do not
have the cupping property. We modify Cai’s result to prove that if T is a consistent, recursively
axiomatizable theory extending IΣ1, then every non-zero b ∈ PT+ has the anti-cupping property
(Corollary 5.3). Consider then the following two statements:
(⋆) Every b that is sufficiently large (where the meaning of ‘sufficiently large’ depends on the
lattice in question) has the anti-cupping property.
(†) Every b > 0 has the anti-cupping property.
Corollary 3.4 states that (⋆) holds in H. By modifying the argument, we also see that (⋆) holds in
the Hα’s. Corollary 5.3 states that (†) holds in PT+ for every consistent, recursively axiomatizable
theory T extending IΣ1. In particular, (†) holds in PPA+ and so, by Kristiansen’s isomorphism,
also in Hǫ0 . Thus the natural question is whether or not (†) holds in H and in every Hα. We expect
that (†) holds in many of the Hα’s by extending Kristiansen’s isomorphism result to fragments of
PA.
2. Honest elementary degrees
In this section, we provide a basic introduction to the theory of the honest elementary degrees.
Again, we refer the reader to [16, 17] for more comprehensive surveys.
Definition 2.1.
• The elementary functions are those functions f : ωn → ω that can be generated from the
initial elementary functions by the elementary definition schemes.
• The initial elementary functions are
– the projection functions ℓki for all k > 0 and i < k, where ℓ
k
i (x0, . . . , xi, . . . , xk−1) = xi;
– the 0-ary constants 0 and 1; addition (+); and truncated subtraction (i.e., monus ´).
• The elementary definition schemes are
– composition: f(~x) = h(g0(~x), g1(~x), . . . , gm−1(~x));
– bounded sum: f(~x, y) =
∑
i<y g(~x, i); and
– bounded product: f(~x, y) =
∏
i<y g(~x, i).
• A relation is elementary if its characteristic function is elementary.
• A function f has elementary graph if the relation R(~x, y) := (f(~x) = y) is elementary.
• A function f : ωn → ω is elementary in a function g : ωk → ω (f ≤E g) if f can be generated
from g and the initial elementary functions by the elementary definition schemes.
• Functions f and g are equivalent (f ≡E g) if f ≤E g and g ≤E f .
The elementary functions have nice closure properties, such as closure under bounded search and
closure under bounded primitive recursion. These closure properties lead to useful alternative char-
acterizations. To wit, the elementary functions are exactly the closure of 0, the successor function,
the projection functions, the exponential function 2x, and the max function under composition and
bounded primitive recursion. One can also take advantage of the fact that Kleene’s T predicate is
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elementary to show that the elementary functions are exactly those functions that can be computed
by Turing machines that run in elementary time. That is, f is elementary if and only if there is a
Turing machine computing f that runs in time O(2nk) for some k, where 2k is the k
th iterate of the
exponential function (so 2n2 = 2
2n , 2n3 = 2
22
n
, and so forth). See [22, Chapter 1] for a presentation
of the above-mentioned facts.
We study the class of all functions with elementary graphs, quasi-ordered by ≤E. By the discus-
sion in [14, Section 1], it suffices to consider the so-called honest functions, as for every function f
with elementary graph, there is an honest function g with g ≡E f .
Definition 2.2. A function f : ωn → ω is honest if
• f is unary: n = 1;
• f dominates 2x: ∀x(f(x) ≥ 2x);
• f is monotone: ∀x(f(x) ≤ f(x+ 1)); and
• f has elementary graph.
The idea behind the terminology is that the output of an honest function gives some indication
of how long the computation took. If f is honest, then there is a Turing machine computing f
whose runtime is elementary in f . What would be considered dishonest is a Turing machine that
makes long computations to produce short outputs (see, for example, [1]).
We can now define the honest elementary degrees.
Definition 2.3.
• The honest elementary degree of an honest function f is
degE(f) = {g : g is honest and g ≡E f}.
• The set of honest elementary degrees is H = {degE(f) : f is honest}.
The≤E relation induces a partial order onH in the usual way: for honest functions f and g, define
degE(f) ≤E degE(g) if f ≤E g. The resulting structure is a distributive lattice with join defined
by degE(f)∪ degE(g) = degE(max[f, g]) and meet defined by degE(f)∩ degE(g) = degE(min[f, g]),
and this lattice has a minimum element 0 = degE(2
x) (see [16]). Here max[f, g] is the function
defined by max[f, g](x) = max(f(x), g(x)), and the function min[f, g] is defined analogously.
For a function f : ω → ω and a k ∈ ω, let fk denote the kth iterate of f , defined by f0(x) = x and
fk+1(x) = f(fk(x)). For functions f, g : ω → ω, write f ≤ g if g dominates f : ∀x(f(x) ≤ g(x)).
Kristiansen’s growth theorem ([11]; see [16, Theorem 2.3]) characterizing the ≤E relation on honest
functions in terms of rates of growth is the key tool for working with the honest elementary degrees.
Growth theorem ([11]). If f and g are honest functions, then f ≤E g if and only if f ≤ g
k for
some k ∈ ω.
3. Honest elementary degrees without the cupping property
Kristiansen’s result [14, Theorem 3.4] (see also [17, Theorem 10] and [16, Theorem 5.3]) states
that every honest elementary degree that is sufficiently large has the cupping property, where
‘sufficiently large’ is made precise by the following definition.
Definition 3.1.
• For functions f, g : ω → ω, define f ≪E g if some fixed iterate of g eventually dominates
every iterate of f : (∃k)(∀m)(∀∞x)(fm(x) ≤ gk(x)).
• For honest elementary degrees degE(f) and degE(g), define degE(f)≪E deg(g) if f ≪E g.
(The notation ‘(∀∞x)ϕ(x)’ abbreviates ‘∃n∀x(x > n → ϕ(x)),’ which means that ϕ(x) holds for
almost every x.)
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As an honest function is equivalent to its finite iterations, it is easy to see that a ≪E b if and
only if there is a g ∈ b that eventually dominates every f ∈ a. We refer the reader to [16, 17] for
more information concerning the ≪E relation, including its original definition in terms of universal
functions. We remark that although <E is a dense partial ordering of H by work of Machtey [20]
(see also [14,16]), it is not known whether ≪E is a dense partial ordering of H (see [21, Section 4]).
The precise statement of Kristiansen’s theorem on cupping is the following.
Theorem 3.2 ([14, Theorem 3.4]). If a and b are honest elementary degrees with 0 ≪E a <E b,
then a cups to b.
Thus if a is an honest elementary degree with a ≫E 0, then a has the cupping property. On
the other hand, 0, being the minimum degree, certainly does not have the cupping property. Kris-
tiansen, Schlage-Puchta, and Weiermann [17] (and again Kristiansen, Lubarsky, Schlage-Puchta,
and Weiermann [16]) therefore ask if Theorem 3.2 can be improved to all a >E 0. We prove that
this is not the case.
Our technical theorem says that if b≫E 0, then there is a a >E 0 that can only cup to degrees
≥E b via degrees that are already ≥E b. Once we have this theorem, it is easy to produce a
non-zero a <E b that does not cup to b by appealing to the distributive lattice structure of H.
Thus we see that b has the anti-cupping property and that there is a non-zero a that does not have
the cupping property.
Let g ∈ b. To prove the theorem, we need to produce an honest f >E 2
x such that for every
honest h, if max[f, h] ≥E g then h ≥E f . Over the course of its computation, f keeps track of a
set C of (indices of) functions h that look like they might satisfy max[f, h]e ≥ g for some e. Here
max[f, h]e is the eth iterate of the function max[f, h]. For each h ∈ C, f tries to stay below h so
that if max[f, h]e really is ≥ g, then h will eventually dominate f . By removing h from C when
learning that max[f, h]e  g, f can find safe numbers x for which f(x) can be large in order to
ensure that f >E 2
x.
Theorem 3.3. For every b ∈ H with b ≫E 0, there is an a ∈ H with a >E 0 such that (∀c ∈
H)[(a ∪ c ≥E b)→ (c ≥E b)].
Proof. For notational ease, we intentionally conflate a Turing machine with the partial function
that it computes. Let (Φe : e ∈ ω) be the usual effective list of all Turing machines. For each
Φe, let Φ̂e be the Turing machine that, on input n, runs Φe on inputs 0, 1, . . . , n and, if all of
these computations halt, outputs the maximum of 2n and the total number of steps that the Φe
computations took. The Turing machine Φ̂e is essentially the honest associate of Φe as defined
in [15], and we have that
• if Φ̂e is total, then it is honest; and
• if h is honest, then there is an e such that h ≡E Φ̂e (see [15, Lemma 4]).
We also think of Φ̂e(n) as being the number of steps in the computation of Φ̂e(n) because the
runtime of Φ̂e is O(Φ̂e).
Let Γ be a Turing machine computing a representative of b that, by the assumption b ≫E 0,
eventually dominates every elementary function. Define a Turing machine Ψ that behaves as follows
on input n.
• Initialize k := 2, M := 1, and C := {0}.
• Main loop: for each m ≤ n, run Φ̂e(m) for all e ∈ C in a dovetailing fashion for at most 2
m
k
steps each.
– If some Φ̂e(m) halts with output N :
∗ For each e ∈ C and each ℓ < m:
· Run Γ(ℓ) and max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) for m steps each, aborting the computation of
max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) if it produces numbers ≥ m. (Observe that the value of Ψ(ℓ)
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is the value of M after iteration ℓ of the main loop, so the computation of
max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) can be facilitated by storing the previous values of M in a
table.)
· If Γ(ℓ) and max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) both halt within m steps and max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) <
Γ(ℓ), then set C := C \ {e}.
∗ Set M := max{M,N, 2m}.
∗ Stop running the Φ̂e(m)’s, and go to the next iteration of the main loop.
– Else:
∗ Set k := k + 1.
∗ Let i be the least number that has never been in C, and set C := C ∪ {i}.
∗ Set M := max{M, 2mk }.
• Output M when the main loop terminates.
Claim 1. Ψ is honest.
Proof of claim. Clearly Ψ is unary. For a given input n, let Mm denote the value of M after
iteration m ≤ n of the main loop. It is easy to see that Mm ≥ 2
m, that Mm is monotonic in m, and
thatMm = Ψ(m). Thus Ψ dominates 2
x and is monotonic. We need to show that Ψ has elementary
graph. Recall from the discussion following Definition 2.1 that the elementary functions are exactly
the functions that can be computed in elementary time. Thus we need to show that the graph of
Ψ is computable in elementary time. As the output of Ψ is always bigger than the corresponding
input, it suffices to show that the runtime of Ψ(n) is elementary in the value of Ψ(n). In fact, we
show that the runtime of Ψ is polynomial in its outputs.
Let Cm be the value of C at the beginning of iteration m of the main loop. Notice that at most
one number is added to C during each iteration, so |Cm| ≤ m + 1. In iteration m, either there
is an e ∈ Cm such that Φ̂e(m) halts within 2
m
k steps, or there is not. Consider first the case in
which there is an e0 ∈ Cm is such that Φ̂e0(m) halts within 2
m
k steps with output N . Then Φ̂e0(m)
halts within O(N) steps, so each Φ̂e(m) with e ∈ Cm is run for O(N) steps because the dovetailed
execution of these machines halts when Φ̂e0(m) halts. Therefore O(|Cm|N) steps are spent running
the Φ̂e(m)’s. Afterward, for each e ∈ C and each ℓ < m, Γ(ℓ) and max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) are run for at
most m steps each and compared. This takes O(|Cm|m
2) steps. Thus the total number of steps
taken in this case is
O(|Cm|N + |Cm|m
2) = O(mN +m3) = O(M3n) = O(Ψ(n)
3),
where the first equality is because |Cm| ≤ m + 1, and the second equality is because m ≤ 2
m ≤
Mm ≤Mn and, in this case, N ≤Mm ≤Mn.
Now consider the case in which no Φ̂e(m) halts within 2
m
k steps. In this case, O(|Cm|2
m
k ) steps are
spent running the Φ̂e(m)’s. Thus the total number of steps taken is O(M
2
n) = O(Ψ(n)
2) because,
in this case, |Cm| ≤ m+ 1 ≤ 2
m
k ≤Mm ≤Mn.
Thus iteration m of the main loop takes O(Ψ(n)3) steps. So Ψ runs in time O(Ψ(n)4). 
Claim 2. Ψ >E 2
x.
Proof of claim. It suffices to show that k increases infinitely often in the sense that for every n0
there is an n ≥ n0 such that, in the execution of Ψ(n), the value of k increases at the end of
iteration n of the main loop. This is because Ψ(n) ≥ 2nk in this case, and, therefore, if k increases
infinitely often, then ∀k∃n(Ψ(n) ≥ 2nk). This implies that Ψ >E 2
x by the growth theorem.
To show that k increases infinitely often, we show that for every n0 there is an n ≥ n0 such that
either k increases or |C| decreases during iteration n of the main loop. Suppose for a contradiction
that there is an n0 such that k never increases and |C| never decreases after iteration n0. Then
iteration n enters the ‘if’ case of the main loop for all n ≥ n0. This implies that there is a fixed k0
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such that, for all n ≥ n0, min{Φ̂e(n) : e ∈ C} < 2
n
k0
and Ψ(n) = max{Ψ(n − 1), N, 2n} for some
N < 2nk0 . It follows that Ψ is elementary by the growth theorem. Furthermore, C never changes
after iteration n0 because no numbers are removed from C by assumption, and no numbers are
added to C because the main loop never enters the ‘else’ case. Thus there must be an e in this
fixed C such that Φ̂e 6≫E 0 because there must be an e ∈ C for which Φ̂e(n) < 2
n
k0
holds for
infinitely many n. For this e, max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e ≡E Φ̂e 6≫E 0, so, because Γ≫E 0, there is an ℓ such that
max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) < Γ(ℓ). Therefore e is removed from C during iteration n of the main loop once
n is large enough so that the computation witnessing that max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) < Γ(ℓ) takes at most n
steps. This contradicts that |C| never decreases after iteration n0.
Now it is easy to see that k increases infinitely often. If not, there is an n0 such that k never
increases after iteration n0. In this case, by the preceding argument, |C| can only decrease, so there
is an n ≥ n0 such that C is empty at the start of iteration n. In this situation, the main loop enters
the ‘else’ case, and k is increased, contradicting that k never increases. 
Claim 3. For every honest h, either max[Ψ, h] E Γ or h ≥E Ψ.
Proof of claim. First, consider an index e of a total Φ̂e. From the proof of the previous claim, k
increases infinitely often, which implies that e is eventually added to C. If e is never removed from
C, then Ψ is O(max[Φ̂e, 2
x]), which implies that Φ̂e ≥E Ψ. On the other hand, if e is eventually
removed from C, then there is an ℓ such that max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) < Γ(ℓ).
Now consider an honest h and the infinitely many indices e such that Φ̂e ≡E h and ∀x(h(x) ≤
Φ̂e(x)). If one such e enters C and is never removed, then h ≡E Φ̂e ≥E Ψ. If every such e
is eventually removed from C after it enters, then for infinitely many e there is an ℓ such that
max[Ψ, h]e(ℓ) ≤ max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e(ℓ) < Γ(ℓ). Hence max[Ψ, h] E Γ by the growth theorem. 
Let a = degE(Ψ). Then a ∈ H by Claim 1, and a >E 0 by Claim 2. If c ∈ H is such that
a ∪ c ≥E b, then c ≥E a by Claim 3. Therefore c ≥E a ∪ c ≥E b as desired, which completes the
proof. 
Corollary 3.4. Every b ∈ H with b≫E 0 has the anti-cupping property.
Proof. Given b≫E 0, by Theorem 3.3, let x >E 0 be such that (∀c ∈ H)[(x∪c ≥E b)→ (c ≥E b)].
Let a = x ∩ b. One readily checks that b ≫E 0 and x >E 0 imply that a >E 0. Now consider
a c ∈ H such that a ∪ c = b. Clearly c ≤E b. On the other hand, using the fact that H is a
distributive lattice,
b = a ∪ c = (x ∩ b) ∪ c = (x ∪ c) ∩ (b ∪ c) = (x ∪ c) ∩ b.
Thus x ∪ c ≥E b, which implies that c ≥E b by the choice of x. Thus c = b. This shows that a
does not cup to b, so a witnesses that b has the anti-cupping property. 
Thus, for every b≫E 0, there is a non-zero a <E b that does not have the cupping property as
witnessed by b. One could also prove Corollary 3.4 by directly ensuring that a ≤E b in the proof
of Theorem 3.3 (by enforcing that Γ dominates Ψ).
Question 3.5. In Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4, can b≫E 0 be weakened to b >E 0?
We have shown that there are non-zero honest elementary degrees that do not have the cupping
property. For the curious readier, we briefly summarize what is known about capping in H. An
element a of a lattice caps to b < a if there is a c > b such that a∩ c = b. If a,b ∈ H are such that
b ≪E a, then a does not cap to b [13]. However, this result does not provide a characterization
of capping in H because there are a,b ∈ H with b <E a and b 6≪E a such that a does not cap to
b [16].
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4. Degrees of relative provability and honest α-elementary degrees
In this section, we provide a basic introduction to the theory of the degrees of relative prov-
ability and the honest α-elementary degrees. We assume familiarity with Peano arithmetic and its
fragments. The most important fragment for us is IΣ1, which consists of the basic axioms and the
induction scheme
[ϕ(0) ∧ ∀n(ϕ(n)→ ϕ(n+ 1))]→ ∀nϕ(n)
restricted to Σ1 formulas ϕ. IΣ1 is Σ1-complete, meaning that IΣ1 proves every true Σ1 sentence.
IΣ1 also suffices to define the Π1 truth predicate ‘true(n),’ which states that n codes (i.e., is the
Go¨del number of) a true Π1 sentence (see, for example, [10, Section I.1(d)] for details). We note
that the Π1 truth predicate is itself Π1. Finally, we mention that IΣ1 proves BΣ1, which consists
of the basic axioms, the induction scheme restricted to Σ0 formulas, and the bounding scheme
∀a[(∀n < a)(∃m)ϕ(n,m)→ (∃b)(∀n < a)(∃m < b)ϕ(n,m)]
restricted to Σ1 formulas ϕ (see [10, Theorem 2.5]). Throughout this section, every theory is
assumed to be in the language of arithmetic, to be consistent, and to extend IΣ1.
First we describe Cai’s degrees of relative provability [7].
Definition 4.1. Fix a theory T . For a Turing machine Φ, let tot(Φ) be the Π2 sentence expressing
that Φ is total.
• Turing machine Φ provably reduces to Turing machine Ψ (Φ ≤T Ψ) if T ⊢ tot(Ψ)→ tot(Φ).
• Turing machines Φ and Ψ are provably equivalent (Φ ≡T Ψ) if Φ ≤T Ψ and Ψ ≤T Φ.
• The provability degree of a Turing machine Φ is
degT (Φ) = {Ψ : Ψ is a Turing machine and Ψ ≡T Φ}
• The set of provability degrees is PT = {degT (Φ) : Φ is a total Turing machine}.
We follow the usual convention that a Turing machine halts on input n if and only if it halts on
all inputs m ≤ n. This is without loss of generality, assuming IΣ1. For a Turing machine Φ, let Φ̂
be the Turing machine that, on input n, runs Φ(0),Φ(1), . . . ,Φ(n) in succession and halts if and
only if (∀m ≤ n)(Φ(m)↓). Then T ⊢ tot(Φ̂)↔ tot(Φ).
It is easy to see that ≤T quasi-orders the Turing machines and therefore induces a partial order
on PT . In fact, PT is a distributive lattice. Let Φ and Ψ be two total Turing machines. Then
degT (Φ) ∪ degT (Ψ) = degT (Γ), where, for each n, Γ(n) runs Φ(n) and Ψ(n) simultaneously and
halts when both Φ(n) and Ψ(n) halt. Similarly, degT (Φ) ∩ degT (Ψ) = degT (Θ), where, for each n,
Θ(n) runs Φ(n) and Ψ(n) simultaneously and halts when either Φ(n) halts or Ψ(n) halts. Notice
that T ⊢ tot(Γ) ↔ (tot(Φ) ∧ tot(Ψ)) and that T ⊢ tot(Θ) ↔ (tot(Φ) ∨ tot(Ψ)). PT also has a
minimum element 0, which is the degree of any Turing machine that T proves is total, such as the
machine that immediately halts and outputs 0 on every input. See [7] for proofs of these facts.
We remark that if ϕ is a true Π2 sentence, then there is a total Turing machine Φ such that
T ⊢ ϕ↔ tot(Φ). Thus one may think of PT as the Lindenbaum algebra of T restricted to true Π2
sentences.
Now we describe Kristiansen, Schlage-Puchta, andWeiermann’s honest α-elementary degrees [17].
First, we recall that every ordinal α < ǫ0 has a Cantor normal form ω
α0 + ωα1 + · · · + ωαn−1 + 0,
where the ordinals α0 ≥ α1 ≥ · · · ≥ αn−1 are themselves in Cantor normal form. This allows us to
define the norm of an ordinal α < ǫ0 by induction on its Cantor normal form.
Definition 4.2. Let α < ǫ0. The norm of α, N(α), is defined by induction on α’s Cantor normal
form by N(0) = 0, N(β + γ) = N(β) +N(γ), and N(ωβ) = 1 +N(β).
This definition of norm allows us to make sense of iterating a function transfinitely many times.
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Definition 4.3. Let f : ω → ω, and let α < ǫ0. The α
th iterate of f , fα, is defined inductively by
f0(n) = f(n)
fα(n) = max{fβ(fβ(n)) : (β < α) ∧ (N(β) ≤ N(α) + n)} for α > 0.
We now define the ‘α-elementary in’ relation by adding transfinite iteration to the elementary
definition schemes of Definition 2.1.
Definition 4.4. Let α ≤ ǫ0.
• A function f : ωn → ω is α-elementary in a function g : ωk → ω (f ≤αE g) if f can be
generated from g and the initial elementary functions of Definition 2.1 by the elementary
definition schemes of Definition 2.1 and by β-iteration for all β < α.
• Functions f and g are equivalent (f ≡αE g) if f ≤αE g and g ≤αE f .
We note that if f is honest and α < ǫ0, then fα is also honest [17].
Let SLim = {α ≤ ǫ0 : (∃β > 0)(α = ω
β)}. For α ∈ SLim, Kristiansen, Schlage-Puchta, and
Weiermann give the following generalization of the growth theorem.
Generalized growth theorem ([17]). If α ∈ SLim and f and g are honest functions, then
f ≤αE g if and only if f ≤ gβ for some β < α.
We define the honest α-elementary degrees for α ∈ SLim analogously to Definition 2.3.
Definition 4.5. Let α ∈ SLim.
• The honest α-elementary degree of an honest function f is
degαE(f) = {g : g is honest and g ≡αE f}
• The set of honest α-elementary degrees is Hα = {degαE(f) : f is honest}.
Again, Hα is a distributive lattice with partial order induced by ≤αE, join and meet defined via
max and min as with H, and minimum element 0 = degαE(2
x) [17]. Notice that Hω = H because
the finite iterates of a function can be defined using the elementary definition schemes.
For a theory T , let T+ denote T extended by all true Π1 sentences. The connection between the
degrees of relative provability and the honest α-elementary degrees is made clear by the following
result of Kristiansen.
Theorem 4.6 ([15]). PPA+ and Hǫ0 are isomorphic.
PT+ and Hα should also be isomorphic for various fragments T of PA and the appropriate
ordinals α, but the details still need to be checked. However, we do not know which, if any, of the
PT+ ’s are isomorphic and which, if any, of the Hα’s are isomorphic.
Question 4.7. Are the PT+ ’s isomorphic for the fragments T of PA extending IΣ1? Are they
elementarily equivalent? Are the Hα’s isomorphic for the α ∈ SLim? Are they elementarily
equivalent?
In the following section, we extend a result of Cai’s implying that there are non-zero elements of
PT+ that do not have the cupping property [8]. Thus, by Theorem 4.6, there are non-zero elements
of Hǫ0 that do not have the cupping property. We can also prove this fact directly by running the
proof of Theorem 3.3 in the context of Hǫ0 . In fact, the proof of Theorem 3.3 can be modified to
show that, for every α ∈ SLim, sufficiently large elements of Hα have the anti-cupping property.
Fix α ∈ SLim, and reinterpret ‘≪’ in the context of Hα by defining f ≪αE g to mean that there
is a γ < α such that gγ eventually dominates fβ for every β < α: (∃γ < α)(∀β < α)(∀
∞x)(fβ(x) ≤
gγ(x)). In particular, b≫αE 0 means that there is a g ∈ b that eventually dominates 2
x
β (the β
th
iterate of 2x) for every β < α.
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As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, fix a Turing machine Γ computing a member of b that eventually
dominates 2xβ for every β < α. Fix an elementary fundamental sequence of ordinals α0 < α1 < . . .
that converges to α. That is, fix an elementary function that maps k to a code for αk. Define the
Turing machine Ψ as before, except now replace 2mk by 2
m
αk
and replace max[Ψ, Φ̂e]
e by max[Ψ, Φ̂e]αe .
Ψ is again honest because its runtime is elementary in its outputs. In order to honestly compute
the 2mαk ’s, use the fact that if f is honest, then the predicate “fαk(x) = y” is elementary, which is
proven in the course of the proof of [17, Lemma 17]. Again, Ψ >αE 2
x because k must increase
infinitely often. That k increases infinitely often implies that Ψ is not dominated by 2xαk for any
k, which, as limk αk = α, implies that Ψ is not dominated by 2
x
β for any β < α. Finally, for any
honest h, either max[Ψ, h] αE Γ or h ≥αE Ψ by again considering the indices e for which Φ̂e ≡αE h
and whether or not they are all eventually removed from C.
5. Degrees of relative provability without the cupping property
Throughout this section, we assume that all theories considered are consistent theories in the
language of arithmetic. In [8], Cai proves that if T is a recursively axiomatizable extension of PA,
then there are non-zero elements of PT+ that do not have the cupping property. We modify Cai’s
proof in a few ways that we hope will be helpful in future work comparing the degrees of relative
provability to the honest α-elementary degrees.
First, we prove a stronger statement: every non-zero b ∈ PT+ has the anti-cupping property.
Second, we work with PT+ directly. Cai considers many different sub-algebras of T ’s Lindenbaum
algebra, and he proves that, in the sub-algebra of true Π1 sentences, there are non-zero elements
that do not have the cupping property. He then obtains the corresponding result for PT+ by
relativization and an application of an isomorphism theorem. We use Cai’s same strategy to
directly define a total Turing machine Ψ whose degree does not non-trivially cup above a given
non-zero degree b. This construction is slightly more complicated than Cai’s original construction,
but we believe it has some benefits in addition to being technically interesting in its own right. The
direct construction is easier to see in terms of Kristiansen’s isomorphism from Theorem 4.6, and
we hope that it will help decide whether or not b ≫αE 0 can be replaced by b >αE 0 in the Hα
cases. The direct construction also makes it a little easier to keep track of how much of T is being
used. In our proof, we only assume that T extends IΣ1, whereas Cai assumes that T extends PA
(though for Cai this assumption is mostly a matter of convenience).
We say that a number t witnesses a Σ1 sentence ∃nϕ(n) if (∃n < t)ϕ(n). That is, t witnesses
∃nϕ(n) if t is large enough to verify that ∃nϕ(n) is true. Let pϕq denote the code of the formula
ϕ according to some fixed Go¨del numbering. We first define a helpful family of auxiliary Turing
machines. For a Π1 sentence η and a finite set C of pairs of the form 〈pπq, e〉, where π is a Π1
sentence and e is the index of a Turing machine, let ApηqC be the Turing machine that behaves as
follows on input s.
• Initialize t := s.
• While true:
– If t witnesses ¬η: halt and output 0.
– If there is a 〈pπq, e〉 ∈ C such that (∀n ≤ s)(Φe,t(n)↓) and t does not witness ¬π: halt
and output 0.
– Else: set t := t+ 1.
(The notation ‘Φe,t(n)↓’ means that the execution of Φe(n) halts within t steps.)
Many of the following arguments combine reasoning in ordinary mathematics with reasoning
inside of a formal theory. We warn the reader that, to keep notational clutter to a minimum,
we intentionally conflate the number s ∈ ω with the standard term that names it. For example,
if we have determined that the Turing machine Φ halts on all inputs n ≤ s and then want to
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reason formally about this, we write ‘(∀n ≤ s)(Φ(n)↓)’ instead of the more technically correct
‘(∀n ≤ s)(Φ(n)↓),’ where s is the name for s.
Lemma 5.1. Let T be a recursively axiomatizable extension of IΣ1.
(1)
T ⊢ (∀C)(∀〈pπq, e〉 ∈ C)[(true(pπq) ∧ tot(Φe))→ tot(A
pηq
C )].
(2) Let η be a true Π1 sentence, and let C be a finite set of pairs. Then
T+ ⊢ tot(ApηqC )↔
∨
〈pπq,e〉∈C
π is true
tot(Φe)
(where the empty disjunction is considered to be false).
Proof. First we prove (1). Working in T , suppose that 〈pπq, e〉 ∈ C, true(pπq), and tot(Φe).
Consider an arbitrary s. By tot(Φe) and BΣ1 (which is provable in IΣ1; see the discussion at the
beginning of Section 4), there is a t ≥ s such that (∀n ≤ s)(Φe,t(n)↓). Such a t does not witness
¬π by the assumption true(pπq). Therefore there is a least t ≥ s such that either t witnesses ¬η
or there is a 〈pπ′q, e′〉 ∈ C such that (∀n ≤ s)(Φe′,t(n)↓) and t does not witness ¬π
′. Therefore
A
pηq
C (s)↓. As s is arbitrary, we conclude tot(A
pηq
C ).
The preceding argument also proves the ‘←’ direction of (2) because if π is true, then true(pπq)
is a true Π1 sentence and hence an axiom of T
+. So we need to prove the ‘→’ direction of (2). We
prove the contrapositive. Work in T+ and suppose that∧
〈pπq,e〉∈C
π is true
¬ tot(Φe).
For the conjunct indexed by 〈pπq, e〉, let se be such that ∀t(Φe,t(se)↑). Let s be larger than all of
the se’s and large enough to witness ¬π for all 〈pπq, e〉 ∈ C with π false. Note that no t can witness
¬η because η is assumed to be true, and thus true(pηq) is an axiom of T+. Thus ApηqC (s)↓ leads to
a contradiction, so we must have that ApηqC (s)↑. Therefore ¬ tot(A
pηq
C ). 
The next theorem is our modification of Cai’s [8, Theorem 7.1] and an analog of Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 5.2. Let T be a recursively axiomatizable extension of IΣ1. For every b ∈ PT+ with
b >T+ 0, there is an a ∈ PT+ such that a∩b >T+ 0 and (∀c ∈ PT+)[(a∪ c ≥T+ b)→ (c ≥T+ b)].
Proof. Let Γ be a total Turing machine with degT+(Γ) = b >T+ 0. Define a Turing machine
Ψ that behaves as follows on input s. The definition of Ψ uses the recursion theorem (see [23,
Theorem II.3.1]) to assume that Ψ has access to its own code.
• Initialize runA := false, C := ∅, p := 0, pηq := p0 = 0q.
• Main loop: for each m ≤ s, do the following:
– If runA is true and m does not witness ¬η: execute ApηqC (m).
– Else:
∗ Set runA := false.
∗ If p codes a proof witnessing
T + π ⊢ (tot(Φe) ∧ tot(Ψ))→ tot(Γ)
for some Π1 sentence π and some e: set C := C ∪ {〈pπq, e〉}.
∗ If p codes a proof witnessing
T + η′ ⊢ tot(Ψ) ∨ tot(Γ)
for some Π1 sentence η
′: set pηq := pη′q, and set runA := true.
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∗ Set p := p+ 1.
• Output 0.
Claim 1. Ψ is total.
Proof of claim. Suppose for a contradiction that Ψ(s)↑ for some s. Observe that Ψ(s)↑ is a true
Π1 sentence and hence an axiom of T
+. Thus T+ ⊢ Ψ(s)↑, so T+ ⊢ ¬ tot(Ψ) (in fact, T+ proves
all true Σ2 sentences by the same argument). As Ψ(s)↑, it must be that the execution of Ψ(s)
executes ApηqC (m) for some η, C, and m for which A
pηq
C (m)↑. For this to happen, it must be that
T + η ⊢ tot(Ψ)∨ tot(Γ). Furthermore, it is easy to see that ApηqC is total if η is false. So it must be
that η is true, in which case T+ ⊢ tot(Ψ) ∨ tot(Γ). From T+ ⊢ ¬ tot(Ψ) and T+ ⊢ tot(Ψ) ∨ tot(Γ)
we conclude that T+ ⊢ tot(Γ), which contradicts that degT+(Γ) = b >T+ 0. 
Claim 2. T+ 0 tot(Ψ) ∨ tot(Γ).
Proof of claim. Suppose for a contradiction that T+ ⊢ tot(Ψ) ∨ tot(Γ), and let p0 be the least
number coding a proof witnessing that T +η0 ⊢ tot(Ψ)∨ tot(Γ) for some true Π1 sentence η0. Then
if p < p0 codes a proof witnessing that T + η ⊢ tot(Ψ)∨ tot(Γ) for some Π1 sentence η, this η must
be false. Therefore, if the main loop is iterated enough times, p is eventually set to p0, in which
case pηq is set to pη0q. Let s0 be the least number such that p is set to p0 during the execution
of Ψ(s0). As Ψ is total by Claim 1, we see that s0 satisfies the Σ1 formula ϕ(s) saying “there is
a sequence (ri)i≤s such that (∀i ≤ s)(ri codes a halting run of Ψ(i)), p is set to p0 during run rs,
and (∀i < s)(p is never set to p0 during run ri).” Thus ϕ(s0) is a true Σ1 sentence, so T ⊢ ϕ(s0)
by Σ1-completeness. That is, T proves that s0 is indeed the least number such that p is set to p0
(and also pηq is set to pη0q) during the execution of Ψ(s0). Let C0 be the value of C when p is set
to p0.
Now we work in T+ to show that T+ ⊢ (∀s > s0)(Ψ(s)↓)↔ (∀s > s0)(A
pη0q
C0
(s)↓). First suppose
that (∀s > s0)(Ψ(s)↓). Consider the execution of Ψ(s) for an s > s0. We know that p is set to
p0 and that pηq is set to pη0q during iteration s0 of the main loop. Also, no number witnesses
¬η0 because η0 is true and hence true(pη0q) is an axiom of T
+. Therefore, the main loop enters
the ‘if’ case in all iterations past s0. In particular, the main loop executes A
pη0q
C0
(s) in iteration
s. Thus Apη0qC0 (s)↓ because Ψ(s)↓. Conversely, suppose that (∀s > s0)(A
pη0q
C0
(s)↓). By Claim 1,
(∀s ≤ s0)(Ψ(s)↓), which is (equivalent to) a true Σ1 sentence. Thus T ⊢ (∀s ≤ s0)(Ψ(s)↓) by
Σ1-completeness. We prove by Σ1-induction on s that (∀s ≥ s0)(Ψ(s)↓). We already know that
Ψ(s0)↓, which gives the base case. Now assume that Ψ(s)↓, and consider the execution of Ψ(s+1).
The execution of Ψ(s+1) reaches iteration s+1 of the main loop because Ψ(s)↓. As argued above,
the main loop executes Apη0qC0 (s+1) in iteration s+1 because s+1 > s0 and true(pη0q) is an axiom
of T+. By assumption Apη0qC0 (s+ 1)↓, so Ψ(s+ 1)↓.
Now, from
T+ ⊢ (∀s > s0)(Ψ(s)↓)↔ (∀s > s0)(A
pη0q
C0
(s)↓),
T ⊢ (∀s ≤ s0)(Ψ(s)↓), and
T ⊢ (∀s > s0)(A
pη0q
C0
(s)↓)↔ tot(Apη0qC0 )
(the last of which is easy to see), we conclude that T+ ⊢ tot(Ψ) ↔ tot(Apη0qC0 ). Therefore, by
Lemma 5.1 item (2),
T+ ⊢ tot(Ψ)↔
∨
〈pπq,e〉∈C0
π is true
tot(Φe).
If the disjunction is empty, then T+ ⊢ ¬ tot(Ψ). Combining this with the assumption T+ ⊢
tot(Ψ)∨ tot(Γ) yields T+ ⊢ tot(Γ), which contradicts that degT+(Γ) = b >T+ 0. If the disjunction
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is not empty, then consider each 〈pπq, e〉 ∈ C0 where π is true. For 〈pπq, e〉 to have been added to
C0, it must be that T+π ⊢ (tot(Φe)∧tot(Ψ))→ tot(Γ). Therefore T
+ ⊢ (tot(Φe)∧tot(Ψ))→ tot(Γ)
because π is true. Thus
T+ ⊢ tot(Ψ)→
∨
〈pπq,e〉∈C0
π is true
(tot(Φe) ∧ tot(Ψ)), and
T+ ⊢


∨
〈pπq,e〉∈C0
π is true
(tot(Φe) ∧ tot(Ψ))

→ tot(Γ).
It follows that T+ ⊢ tot(Ψ) → tot(Γ). Combining this with the assumption T+ ⊢ tot(Ψ) ∨ tot(Γ)
yields T+ ⊢ tot(Γ), which again contradicts that degT+(Γ) = b >T+ 0. Thus T
+ 0 tot(Ψ)∨ tot(Γ),
as desired. 
Claim 3. If e is such that T+ ⊢ (tot(Φe) ∧ tot(Ψ))→ tot(Γ), then T
+ ⊢ tot(Φe)→ tot(Ψ).
Proof of claim. We start by showing that p increases infinitely often in the sense that for every p0
there is an m such that p is set to p0 in iteration m of the main loop. First, Ψ is total by Claim 1,
so Ψ never diverges during the execution of the main loop. Second, p increases exactly in iterations
where the main loop enters the ‘else’ case. Thus if p increases only finitely often, there must be an
m0 such that main loop only enters the ‘if’ case in iterations past m0. For this to happen, there
must be a true Π1 sentence η
′ such that T +η′ ⊢ tot(Ψ)∨ tot(Γ). Thus T+ ⊢ tot(Ψ)∨ tot(Γ), which
contradicts Claim 2.
Now, suppose that T+ ⊢ (tot(Φe) ∧ tot(Ψ)) → tot(Γ), and let p0 be a proof witnessing that
T +π ⊢ (tot(Φe)∧ tot(Ψ))→ tot(Γ) for some true Π1 sentence π. Let s0 be such that p is increased
from p0 to p0 + 1 during iteration s0 of the main loop, so that 〈pπq, e〉 is added to C during this
iteration. We now argue in T+ that tot(Φe) → tot(Ψ). As argued in Claim 2, (∀s ≤ s0)(Ψ(s)↓)
is (equivalent to) a true Σ1 sentence, so T ⊢ (∀s ≤ s0)(Ψ(s)↓) by Σ1-completeness. We prove by
Σ1-induction on s that (∀s ≥ s0)(Ψ(s)↓). We already know that Ψ(s0)↓, which gives the base case.
Now assume that Ψ(s)↓, and consider the execution of Ψ(s+1). The execution of Ψ(s+1) reaches
iteration s+1 of the main loop because Ψ(s)↓. If iteration s+1 enters the ‘else’ case, then clearly
Ψ(s+1)↓. If iteration s+1 enters the ‘if’ case, then it executes ApηqC (s+1). However, 〈pπq, e〉 ∈ C
because it entered C during iteration s0 < s+1. Thus from the true Π1 sentence true(pπq) (which
is an axiom of T+), the assumption tot(Φe), and Lemma 5.1 item (i), we conclude that A
pηq
C (s+1)↓.
Thus Ψ(s+ 1)↓. This completes the induction. Finally, we conclude tot(Ψ) from (∀s ≤ s0)(Ψ(s)↓)
and (∀s ≥ s0)(Ψ(s)↓). Thus T
+ ⊢ tot(Φe)→ tot(Ψ), as desired. 
Let a = degT+(Ψ). Then a ∩ b >T+ 0 by Claim 2. If c is such that a ∪ c ≥T+ b, then c ≥T+ a
by Claim 3, so c ≥T+ b. 
Corollary 5.3. Let T be a recursively axiomatizable extension of IΣ1. Then every b ∈ PT+ with
b >T+ 0 has the anti-cupping property.
Proof. Given b >T+ 0, by Theorem 5.2, let x be such that x∩b >T+ 0 and (∀c)[(x∪ c ≥T+ b)→
(c ≥T+ b)]. Let a = x ∩ b. Then 0 <T+ a <T+ b. Now consider a c ∈ PT+ such that a ∪ c = b.
Clearly c ≤T+ b. On the other hand, using the fact that PT+ is a distributive lattice,
b = a ∪ c = (x ∩ b) ∪ c = (x ∪ c) ∩ (b ∪ c) = (x ∪ c) ∩ b.
Thus x ∪ c ≥T+ b, which implies that c ≥T+ b by the choice of x. Thus c = b. This shows that a
does not cup to b, so a witnesses that b has the anti-cupping property. 
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Theorem 5.2 and Corollary 5.3 also hold with T in place of T+. In this situation, the definition
of Ψ can be simplified because there is no longer any need for the π’s and η’s. One must be careful
to check that a similar verification can be done using only T .
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